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Just 2.3% of MPs in Africa are 30 or under, according to the latest Inter Parliamentary Union data. No African country features in the top ten for young legislators as a percentage of total seats, even though 70% of the continent’s population is estimated to be in this age group. This matters for intersectional inclusion because global data shows that there is much greater gender equality among elected officials in this age bracket – 42.6% of all MPs aged 21-30 are female. 

Data from the Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI) points to structural challenges underpinning youth participation across the African continent. The mean GYPI score of African countries is 51.34, meaning that the continent’s overall rank would place it 109^th out of the 142 countries surveyed. A combination of legal impediments, socio-cultural attitudes and financial requirements constitutes barriers to political entry for youth on the continent. This spotlight will focus on the financial obstacles to participation.  

The concept of the cost of politics encompasses both financial and non-financial costs that a political aspirant incurs in seeking and maintaining elected office, whether representing a political party or running as an independent (where possible). It is both narrower and broader than the related concepts of political finance or campaign finance, as it focuses on the expenditure of individuals rather than political parties, and on expenditures both inside and outside official election campaign periods. It includes costs incurred during periods of “getting known” in your community, formal candidate nomination processes, running election or re-election campaigns, election-day expenditure and outlays required whilst in office or during periods outside formal politics for unsuccessful candidates who maintain political ambitions. 

Over the past decade, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) and its partners have sought a deeper understanding of these dynamics. Of the almost 40 ‘cost of politics’ studies undertaken to date, 17 have focused on African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, The Gambia, Uganda and Zambia. This spotlight draws on this rich evidence base to present a better understanding of the ongoing and informal costs of seeking and maintaining elective legislative office, the absence or high cost of political party support and how these factors affect youth participation in formal politics. In conclusion, it proposes ways to tackle the high cost of political participation for youth and to support more inclusive and accountable legislatures.

Table 1: Global Youth Participation Index ranking of the 17 African countries covered by the cost of politics studies

Differences in youth participation and inclusion are driven primarily by a small number of high-performing countries (Mauritius, Ghana and South Africa) and low-performing countries (Mali, the DRC and Uganda), rather than by substantial variation across the full sample. The mean and median scores are 55.8 and 56.4, respectively, indicating a relatively balanced overall distribution. However, disaggregating the data reveals weaker performance in the dimension of political affairs, which has a mean score of 50. This underperformance is relatively uniform across the sample, with a median score of 49.3 closely approximating the mean. This suggests limited skewness in the distribution and indicates that challenges to youth political participation are broadly consistent across contexts. Moreover, of the 17 countries analysed, only Uganda has institutionalised a youth quota to ensure youth representation. In addition, 14 of the 17 countries studied have youth wings or youth associations within their major political parties, although only eight have such structures across all parties represented in the national legislature. Finally, only 13 of the 17 countries have adopted a national youth policy.

During official campaign periods, candidates expend significant resources to engage their constituents, mobilise support teams and secure adequate media and, increasingly, digital, coverage. However, individual expenditures are not limited by regulation in 58.8% of African countries according to International IDEA’s ‘Political Finance Database‘. The challenge of effective enforcement is widespread, despite the fact that in just over half the countries, there is a legal requirement for candidates to report expenditures. For political parties, the reporting requirement is even higher across the continent (80.4%). Both candidates and parties regularly circumvent such provisions, with enforcement bodies hampered by a combination of weak political will and limited technical capacity. 

Formal campaign periods are the most regulated, even if enforcement is patchy, but this is only part of the near-continual cycle of the cost of politics. The pre-election costs of engaging constituent communities and their socio-cultural leaders are significant and can vary across contexts depending on the political system. In Liberia, one aspirant explained how the notion of leaders as people who take care of the lives of their communities is ingrained in society. They used the analogy of not wanting to take a hungry dog hunting, as it will eat the meat before it returns to you, as a way of explaining why communities expect prospective aspirants to demonstrate their wealth. 

Subsequently, aspiring candidates have to navigate political party nomination processes. In Senegal and South Africa, stronger party structures support more merit-based selection processes. Whereas in contexts like Sierra Leone (where the move to proportional representation has driven increased intra-party competition for the top positions on party lists, especially in party strongholds), Uganda (where the ruling party ticket can significantly increase the chances of political success) and Nigeria (where parties primarily function as vehicles for campaigning rather than ideology), securing a party ticket is crucial. This drives higher expenditure during this phase of the electoral cycle. 

In 2021, candidates in Uganda spent, on average, 47.8% of total expenditures to secure selection, with the average split between pre-election costs and those incurred during official campaign periods of 30-70 in the 10 of WFD’s 17 studies where sufficient data is available. In Nigeria, where the cost of politics is the highest in the sample, one candidate spoke of spending N500 million (over US$300,000) in an unsuccessful effort to secure the party ticket to run for the National Assembly in 2023. 

Even in countries where campaign finance limits are effectively enforced, a rarity on the African continent, these limits do not cover pre-election periods, when it is primarily individual candidates who raise the substantial resources required. This significantly disadvantages youth, particularly young women, as they have limited access to the networks and collateral needed to raise sufficient funds. The result is that youth political participation is largely restricted to those from wealthy or well-established political families. 

A similar pattern of incomplete implementation and weak enforcement is evident with respect to vote buying. Although more than 80% of countries on the continent formally prohibit the practice, paying influential community figures to mobilise voting blocs and distributing cash handouts to voters on or immediately before election day remain widespread. Indeed, such expenditures are often treated as a routine component of campaign budgets. In the DRC, where vote buying is formally prohibited, candidates reported distributing between US$2 and US$5 per voter at campaign meetings, amounting to as much as $15,000 or 20% of their overall campaign expenditure. Similarly, data collected in 2015 by Afrobarometer from respondents in 36 countries found that 41.7% viewed voter bribery as occurring “always” or “often”. Although this transactional approach does not necessarily guarantee electoral success, as voters are increasingly adept at navigating these exchanges to their own advantage, it continues to be widely perceived by aspiring candidates as a prerequisite for mounting a competitive campaign. 

The personal financial burden for candidates to get known, nominated and elected is significant and is perhaps best understood in relation to the average annual per capita income. The average Ugandan, Congolese, Liberian and Nigerian would need to save their full income every year for over 100 years to raise the average amount that candidates reported spending in those contexts. With those in Mali, Niger, Benin, Malawi, Zambia and Ghana requiring a near lifetime of average earnings just to effectively contest an election. 

Table 2: Cost to get elected vs per capita income

Furthermore, expenditure does not stop at the ballot box. It continues after the elections for both incumbents and for those unsuccessful candidates who retain political ambitions. The latter need to increase their community contributions between elections if they are to be considered serious future contenders. Those in elected office are expected to bring major projects to their constituencies and respond to voters’ personal requests. Across the continent, legislators are viewed as direct service providers rather than representatives tasked with addressing structural development challenges. In Benin, as elsewhere, elected representatives are expected to respond to the medical, spiritual and educational needs of their constituents, to donate to influential groupings and leaders, to contribute to party operations and activities and to build constituency infrastructure. As one legislator stated: “We are social workers for our electorate”. 

Meeting these expectations often leads to elected legislators spending in excess of their parliamentary stipend to respond to constituent needs. Parliamentarians in Uganda and Kenya who receive pre-benefit stipends of $98,400 and $74,544, respectively, estimated that they were spending 108% and 125% of their salaries on meeting constituency demands, according to data from the 2021 WFD studies. In Sierra Leone, a former parliamentarian described their monthly stipend as “dead on arrival” due to the financial requests from constituents. In countries where constituency development funds or other mechanisms for funding local development exist, these in-office costs can be partially covered, but, even in these contexts, direct service provision needs to be financed by the individual political actor or their network of financial backers.

The popular perception remains that politics is a money-making venture, with those who hold elective office enjoying significant financial benefits,  which constituents seek to access. However, the data show that in some contexts, in-office expenditure outstrips parliamentarians’ pre-benefit earnings. This raises questions about the financial feasibility of contesting, especially given that, in Uganda and Kenya, the cost of winning a seat is 138% and 244% of the annual parliamentary stipend. In these contexts, and these are not anomalies, corruption risks are heightened as elected officials seek to obtain resources needed to maintain themselves in office and meet citizen expectations. As debts pile up, the incentives for corruption increase. The challenges of winning consecutive terms remain acute, as the contest for the next election campaign begins almost as soon as the previous race finishes.

Across the cost of politics studies, personal resources and networks of families and friends emerge as the most important means of candidate fundraising for political campaigns. Loans are an increasingly important feature of the financing landscape, particularly for incumbent candidates, with banks actively targeting newly elected legislators to help them respond to constituency needs. Wealthy individuals or businesses also look to fund individual candidates. However, this funding often comes with the expectation of a return on the investment. Candidates are faced with a choice of misappropriating funds, manipulating procurement processes or selling their vote in parliament to the highest bidder.

Financial backing for candidates from their political parties remains limited. In fact, parties actively try to recruit parliamentary candidates capable of funding themselves. In Zambia, the national selection committees of the main parties assess the financial status of prospective candidates, including by requesting bank statements and asset declarations during party nominations. Money spent during the nomination period is considered an indication of a prospective candidate’s overall spending capacity. Furthermore, respondents regularly reported that party delegates and senior officials solicited payments in exchange for their support during the nomination process. This can even create bidding wars within the parties, particularly where the party is dominant in a particular constituency or district and nomination is a guarantor of electoral success.

In Kenya and Nigeria, primaries offer parties an opportunity to raise much needed resources from aspiring candidates. Even though Kenya is among the 34 African countries with some degree of public funding for political parties, according to International IDEA’s ‘Political Finance Database‘, outside the political season, many fold down to minimal staffing and “operations slow to a crawl”. Membership contributions are a negligible factor in funding parties both between and during elections in Kenya, where the electorate expects politicians and political parties to compensate them for their support. As an interviewee noted:“It is, therefore, almost inconceivable for most Kenyans to pay a membership fee to join a political party. In practice, membership cards are usually purchased in bulk by a candidate or political benefactor and distributed at political rallies and meetings. It is considered a worthwhile investment in building a potential base of ‘party’ supporters”.

Even where provisions for the state funding of political parties are in place, limited transparency regarding how funds are allocated within parties means that funds are rarely distributed equitably. Youth, particularly young women, are most affected because they are less integrated into political networks. Female candidates in the DRC expressed frustration with discrimination, stating that “when it comes to parties’ distribution of funds, more money is given to men”.

Opportunities for young candidates, and young women in particular, are further limited by the fact that very few parties on the continent have adhered to internal quotas for nominating female or youth candidates. The lack of dedicated pathways forces them to compete against established political actors with more connections, greater resources and political capital. GYPI data show that, of the 17 countries analysed, only Uganda has institutionalised a youth quota to ensure youth representation. With regard to political parties represented in national legislatures, the major parties in 14 of the 17 countries have some form of youth wing or association, but only eight report that these are consistently present across all parties represented in the national legislature.

This dynamic pushes many younger candidates to contest elections on the ticket of smaller parties, which often struggle to field candidates for all available seats, and are therefore more open to broader representation. However, these parties frequently lack the resources or are unwilling to allocate funds to candidates, placing the financial burden squarely on individuals. Candidates are often expected to cover campaign expenses themselves, including basic costs such as official nomination fees payable to the election management body. As a result, the financial barriers to political participation are shifted rather than removed, and remain a significant obstacle to anyone seeking elected office. Similar dynamics apply where independent candidates are permitted.

Across the continent, the high cost of politics discourages youth from contesting elections and from participating actively in decision-making processes. Political systems and structures that are designed to favour and reinforce the status quo make it particularly difficult for young people, especially those from ordinary socioeconomic backgrounds, to enter into and sustain a political career. Young women face additional intersectional barriers linked to cultural attitudes towards female leadership and the security risks that are associated with seeking political office in many parts of the continent. Combined with financial constraints, these challenges contribute to political exclusion of those without established political networks or connections. 

The heavy reliance on financial resources to shape, sustain and drive current political systems, rather than on ideas, policies and development agendas, has fostered a form of transactional politics that either excludes young people or discourages them from active citizenship – from holding their elected leaders to account. This disconnect between elected representatives and their constituents, driven by the predominance of money in politics, not only heightens the risk of corruption but also weakens this important channel through which young people could articulate their grievances and contribute their visions for future development.  

These dynamics can, in turn, contribute to political disengagement among young voters. Youth participation in formal political processes has steadily declined across several African countries despite the demographic dominance of this age group. However, disengagement from electoral politics should not be mistaken for political apathy or a lack of interest in being heard or driving change. Recent youth-driven protests in Kenya, Madagascar and Senegal have shown that young people are willing to mobilise. The challenge, therefore, is to identify ways to reduce the financial barriers to political participation for young people, thereby fostering more equitable, representative and accountable political systems across the African continent.

• Domestic election observers should expand election observation beyond the campaign period to include party primaries and selections, or at least integrate analysis that better reflects the realities of electoral financing and intersectional variations.
• Domestic election observers should monitor the agencies and bodies responsible for enforcing campaign finance and spending regulations.
• Political parties should introduce and apply internal selection quotas for young people, particularly for young women. 
• Political parties should be more transparent and accountable regarding their candidate selection processes, internal financing, the allocation of public funding and the resources dedicated to youth and women’s political participation.
• International donors and democracy support practitioners should continue to support youth-led civic engagement initiatives on the role of elected officials in preventing vote buying. Consideration should be given to creating platforms, such as citizen assemblies, to re-engage young people in politics and strengthen their connection to elected officials. 
• International donors and democracy support practitioners should support the development of democratic political parties through party-to-party dialogue, peer support, capacity-building initiatives, mentorship programmes and support for internal democratic governance, transparency and inclusive participation mechanisms.

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¹ These studies have used a shared understanding of the cost of politics but not a shared methodology for collecting data. In nine studies (Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Zambia, Malawi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali) survey tools were used to gather more robust data to support analysis and interpretation of corresponding qualitative data. The remaining studies draw on indicative data points gathered through key informant interviews and focus group discussions.